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Note: The sample includes 92 FY2010 MDAPs with a baseline estimate beyond Milestone B in the June 2010 SAR as well as twelve additional 
cancelled programs, notably including the Future Combat System (FCS).
Source: Selected Acquisition Reports; analysis by CSIS Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group
Real cost overruns 
(in percent, quantity adjusted)
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3
Note: The sample includes 92 FY2010 MDAPs with a baseline estimate beyond Milestone B in the June 2010 SAR as well as twelve additional 
cancelled programs, notably including the Future Combat System (FCS).
Source: Selected Acquisition Reports; analysis by CSIS Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group
Cost Increase Cost Decrease Average Increase Baseline-Weighted Average Increase
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Note: The sample includes 92 FY2010 MDAPs with a baseline estimate beyond Milestone B in the June 2010 SAR as well as twelve additional 
cancelled programs, notably including the Future Combat System (FCS).
Source: Selected Acquisition Reports; analysis by CSIS Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group
Year of last baseline estimate
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Note: The sample includes 92 FY2010 MDAPs with a baseline estimate beyond Milestone B in the June 2010 SAR as well as twelve additional 
cancelled programs, notably including the Future Combat System (FCS). WIN-T Increment 2 was changed baseline years in 2010, but the 
compound annual growth rate was calculated as if the change happened in 2009.
Source: Selected Acquisition Reports; analysis by CSIS Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group
Year of last baseline estimate
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Note: The sample includes 92 FY2010 MDAPs with a baseline estimate beyond Milestone B in the June 2010 SAR as well as twelve additional 
cancelled programs, notably including the Future Combat System (FCS).
Source: Selected Acquisition Reports; analysis by CSIS Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group
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Note: The sample includes 92 FY2010 MDAPs with a baseline estimate beyond Milestone B in the June 2010 SAR as well as twelve additional 
cancelled programs, notably including the Future Combat System (FCS).
Source: Selected Acquisition Reports; analysis by CSIS Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group
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Note: The sample includes 92 FY2010 MDAPs with a baseline estimate beyond Milestone B in the June 2010 SAR as well as twelve additional 
cancelled programs, notably including the Future Combat System (FCS).
Source: Selected Acquisition Reports; analysis by CSIS Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group
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Note: The sample includes 92 FY2010 MDAPs with a baseline estimate beyond Milestone B in the June 2010 SAR as well as twelve additional 
cancelled programs, notably including the Future Combat System (FCS).
Source: Selected Acquisition Reports; analysis by CSIS Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group
Cost Increase Cost Decrease Average Overrun Baseline-Weighted Average Overrun
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Note: The sample includes 92 FY2010 MDAPs with a baseline estimate beyond Milestone B in the June 2010 SAR as well as twelve additional 
cancelled programs, notably including the Future Combat System (FCS).
Source: Selected Acquisition Reports; 2004-2009 FPDS data; analysis by CSIS Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group.
Cost Increase Cost Decrease Average Overrun Baseline-Weighted Average Overrun
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• Cost (all other) includes time and materials contracts as well as labor hours contracts. 
Note: The sample includes 92 FY2010 MDAPs with a baseline estimate beyond Milestone B in the June 2010 SAR as well as twelve additional 
cancelled programs, notably including the Future Combat System (FCS).
Source: Selected Acquisition Reports; 2004-2009 FPDS data; analysis by CSIS Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group.
Cost Increase Cost Decrease Average Overrun Baseline-Weighted Average Overrun
Fi din ngs
• Changes in cost estimates are responsible for around 40 
percent of the accumulated cost overruns. 
• Newer programs appear not to perform better than older 
programs when judged based on compound annual 
growth rate.
• Fixed price contracts appear to have relatively smaller 
overruns.




At a time of new global opportunities and challenges, the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS) provides strategic insights and policy solutions to decisionmakers in government international
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institutions, the private sector, and civil society. A bipartisan, nonprofit organization headquartered in 
Washington, DC, CSIS conducts research and analysis and develops policy initiatives that look into the future 
and anticipate change. 
Founded by David M Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke at the height of the Cold War CSIS was   .          ,   
dedicated to finding ways for America to sustain its prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the 
world. 
Since 1962, CSIS has grown to become one of the world’s preeminent international policy institutions, 
with more than 220 full-time staff and a large network of affiliated scholars focused on defense and security                 , 
regional stability, and transnational challenges ranging from energy and climate to global development and 
economic integration.
Former U.S. senator Sam Nunn became chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in 1999, and John J. 
Hamre has led CSIS as its president and chief executive officer since April 2000            
CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed in this presentation should be 
understood to be solely those of the author(s).
